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Abstract By discriminating between a lazy manager and a career concerns hypothe-
sis, Aghion et al. (Am Econ Rev 103(1):277–304, 2013. doi:10.1257/aer.103.1.277)
try to disentangle the link between innovation and institutional ownership. Citation-
weighted patent counts are used as a proxy for innovation, which motivates the use
of count data models. A replication in a narrow sense confirms their empirical results
which are mainly based on Poisson models (i.e., with a single set of regression coeffi-
cients). However, when extending the model framework by count data hurdle models,
it is shown that the two hurdle parts do not coincide—as they should under the Pois-
son model—but lead to different results. Nevertheless, a remarkably stable positive
correlation of citation-weighted patents and institutional ownership across all model
specifications can be shown.
Keywords Innovation · Institutional ownership · Count data · Hurdle model ·
Replication
JEL Classification C25 · G32 · O31
1 Introduction
What sets the wheels of innovation in motion? And what keeps them running? With a
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et al. (2013) attract attention to institutional ownership that comprises ‘…all investors
in financial markets which are neither private households nor public institutions’
(Menkhoff 2002, p. 907).
Aghion et al. (2013) show empirically that institutional ownership is positively cor-
related with innovation. Additionally, the authors aim to disentangle the link between
innovation, institutional ownership, and product market competition. This is achieved
by an empirical discrimination between a lazy manager and a career concerns hypoth-
esis. As the dependent variable innovation is mapped out through the use of future
citation-weighted patent counts, the methodological approach employed by Aghion
et al. (2013) is based on count data models. The authors estimate a Poisson model for
the mean equation and employ standard errors clustered at either the firm level or a
three-digit industry level.
Replication in a narrow sense—i.e., using the same data and model specification,
but a different software package—largely confirms the empirical results obtained by
Aghion et al. (2013). The software in use for the replication as well as for an extended
analysis is R (R Core Team 2013), instead of Stata (StataCorp. 2011), which is used
by Aghion et al. (2013). Only in the negative binomial specification, some differences
had to be resolved regarding standard errors and starting values.
We argue that the relevance of factors that contribute to the occurrence of innovative
outcome differs between two distinct processes. Two aspects are of main interest in
this context: the determinants that are necessary for a firm to be able to innovate and the
factors that keep an already innovating firm carrying out further innovations. Thus, we
go one step further and extend the analysis of Aghion et al. (2013) with hurdle models,
which are useful to shed some light on potentially existing structural differences. Hur-
dle models are two-part models with a binary part that models the decision to innovate
at all, and a count part that models ongoing innovation, respectively. This approach can
be subsumed as a ‘replication in a wider sense’—i.e., critically assessing the analysis
by altering the econometric model—we present a robustness check that reveals on the
one hand a stable positive correlation of innovation with institutional ownership, but
on the other hand, the results are inconclusive regarding the career concerns and the
lazy manager hypothesis. Indeed, there is some indication for a departure from the
single-equation Poissonmodel, both from a statistical aswell as from an economic per-
spective, as the Poisson model implicitly assumes one underlying process, for which
the factors that drive innovation are the same. However, it might be the case that the
first innovation is more difficult to achieve, especially compared to succeeding innova-
tions. Froma statistical perspective, both hurdle parts should produce similar parameter
estimates to those obtained by a Poisson specification if the assumption of one under-
lying process is correct. Due to differing parameter estimates, there is some indication
that the innovation process is not adequately reflected by a single-equation Poisson
model. Thus, our contribution is the use of amore flexiblemodeling approach achieved
through the utilization of count data hurdle models, instead of Poisson models. We
argue that two-part hurdlemodels are an interesting alternative that can provide uswith
new insights into the determinants that trigger innovative outcome. Moreover, altering
the econometric model from Poisson to the more general hurdle model enables us to
uncover the instability of effects which Aghion et al. (2013) place great emphasis on.
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In linewithAghion et al. (2013),most studies in the empirical literature that consider
the relationship between (institutional) ownership structure and innovation (or R&D
spendings) find a positive correlation.1 To name a few examples, Baysinger et al.
(1991) find a positive effect of institutional investors on R&D spendings (see also
Hansen and Hill 1991). Kochhar and David (1996) state that institutions are long-
term oriented, and thus have a positive influence on firm innovation. Bushee (1998)
finds that high institutional ownership is accompanied by a reluctance from managers
to cut R&D after a decline in earnings. David et al. (2001) state that it is rather
institutional investor activism that has a positive influence on R&D input. Summing
up, a variety of components appear in the recent literature that can explain a positive
effect of institutional investors on innovation. However, in this context the discussion
only rarely addresses to what extent hurdle models can lead to new insights into the
emergence of innovation. Nevertheless, some scholars have stated that there are two
phases of the innovation process that are subject to different constraints (König and
Licht 1995; Licht and Zoz 1996; Crepon and Duguet 1997; Brouwer and Kleinknecht
1999; Mohnen and Röller 2005; Mäkinen 2007). Moreover, Xu et al. (2015) find that
the influence of institutional owners is not the same for these differing innovation
processes, thus justifying the use of hurdle models. Another part of the literature has
found that the propensity to patent—the fraction of innovations for which at least one
patent application is filed—differs across industries, firms, and kinds of innovations
(Comanor and Scherer 1969; Basberg 1987; Griliches 1990; Archibugi and Planta
1996; Kleinknecht et al. 2002; Van Der Panne and Kleinknecht 2005). To model these
nonlinearities in the innovation process, hurdlemodels are, though not very frequently,
applied in the literature (König and Licht 1995; Licht and Zoz 1996; Crepon and
Duguet 1997; Brouwer and Kleinknecht 1999). For example, Licht and Zoz (1996)
state that the decision to apply for a first patent and the decision to apply for succeeding
patents are ruled by different processes. The protection of intellectual property rights
and how to deal with patentable inventions are basic issues that require reflection of
the firms, especially when the yield of holding a patent is unknown. While this basic
decision is often based on the context of the first invention, the decision to apply for
patents for further inventions rests on this first principle decision (Licht andZoz 1996).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 comprises the replication
of the basic results obtained by Aghion et al. (2013) as well as an extension of their
analysis by means of hurdle models, and Sect. 3 contains the replication and extension
of models with competition included as a further explanatory variable. Section 4
concludes.
2 Basic models: innovation and institutional ownership
2.1 Replication (in a narrow sense)
Future citation-weighted patent counts are used as a proxy for the dependent variable
innovation, which motivates the use of count data models. As a starting point (and
1 An exception that ‘confirms’ the rule is Graves (1988), who finds a significant negative relationship
between institutional ownership and R&D expenditures in the computer industry.
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following Aghion et al. 2013), a log link is implemented. In the spirit of a quasi-
maximum likelihood approach, the Poisson model is employed for the mean equation
along with clustered standard errors. The conditional expectation function is
E(Citesi t | xi t , γi , δt ) = exp
(
xTi tβ + γi + δt
)
, (1)
where Citesi t is the number of citation-weighted patent counts for company i in year
t , the vector xi t contains all explanatory variables for firm i in year t in the model, γi is
firm-specific fixed effects controls, and δt is time dummy variable (Aghion et al. 2013,
pp. 280–281). All models include institutional ownership, which is measured as the
percentage of outstanding shares held by institutions, the capital to labor ratio aswell as
sales (in logs), time dummies and four-digit industry dummies as explanatory variables
(Aghion et al. 2013). Somemodels additionally include the stock ofR&Dexpenditures
(in logs) and the presamplemean-scaling estimator2 developed byBlundell and Powell
(2004).
Table 1 comprises the (successful) replication of Table 1 in Aghion et al. (2013,
p. 283) , where the outcomes show that the coefficient of institutional ownership is
consistently positive and significant.
In the negative binomial specification, some additional efforts are necessary to
resolve differences betweenStata (StataCorp. 2011) andR (RCoreTeam2013) regard-
ing starting values and standard errors. As for the former, the function glm.nb()
(Venables and Ripley 2002), used for negative binomial regression in R, sometimes
has problems to find starting values for very high-dimensional regressions. Hence,
we estimate the negative binomial parameter estimates using a quasi-Newton opti-
mization based on analytical gradients and a numerical approximation of the Hessian
starting from Poisson coefficient estimates. Concerning the clustered sandwich stan-
dard errors, Stata and R give different results by default. The root of this difference is
that the standard errors in Stata are based on the observed information matrix while R
employs the expected information by default. When employing the numerical approx-
imation of the observed information in R, Stata’s results can be replicated except for
small numeric differences that are likely due to the great amount of industry dummies
as well as the model specification.
2.2 Extended analysis
However, the data show overdispersion as well as excess zeros. There are about 35.2%
(accounting for 2183 out of 6208) firm–year observations with zero citation-weighted
patents in the data. On one hand, the zeros can come from either the decision to keep
potentially patentable discoveries in secrecy, or from the lack of any patentable finding
(see Crepon and Duguet 1997), both of which resulting in a lack of any patents. On
the other hand, the zeros can come from holding patents, but without citations. In the
data analyzed, there are about 32.6% firm–year observations with zero patents in the
2 To account for firm-specific fixed effects, the presample average of citation-weighted patents is included
into the model (Aghion et al. 2013, p. 281).
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data and 2.6% with patents but without citations. In other words, there are only a few
patents in our data which do not get cited. Summarizing the above, the amount of
zeros in the dependent variable is higher than expected by the Poisson distribution,
which casts doubt on the distributional assumption and suggests potentially different
determinants driving the zero and nonzero citations.
Furthermore, overdispersion is a common characteristic of count data (in the field
of economics), meaning that the conditional variance is higher than the conditional
mean. The fraction Var(Cites)Mean(Cites) = 4836.2 reveals a substantial amount of overdispersion
for citation-weighted patents (note that covariates are not taken into account here). A
negative binomial model offers some remedy in such a situation (see, e.g., Hausman
et al. 1984). As a likelihood model, it does explicitly account for dispersion. Aghion
et al. (2013) consider negative binomial models only in their basic models in Table 1
(columns 6, 7, and 8). However, it is worth pointing out that the negative binomial
model does also not explain the high proportion of zero citations discussed above.
Finally, the Poisson model assumes independent occurrences over time (see, e.g.,
Cameron and Trivedi 1998) and it may also be the case that the first innovation (the
first citation-weighted patent count) is especially hard to obtain in comparison with
succeeding innovations, such that ‘…the innovation process is characterized by non-
linearities’ (Crepon and Duguet 1997, p. 360). For example, in case of the discovery of
a seminal innovation, some further discoveries of minor importance can follow more
easily (Crepon and Duguet 1997).
Our investigation is not so much motivated by the huge amount of zeros or overdis-
persion in the data, but rather uses hurdle models to allow for potentially different
processes driving innovation. Employing the Poisson model for the mean equation
along with clustered standard errors cannot accommodate differing processes.
In summary, these considerations concerning excess zeros, overdispersion, and
potentially different determinants in the innovation process can be addressed by two-
part hurdle models. Specifically, these consider the case that there are two different
processes driving either the ‘first innovation’ (does a companyownat least one citation-
weighted patent) or the ‘continuing innovation’ decision (if a company has a positive
number of citation-weighted patents, how many of them does it possess).3
Positive outcomes are observed whether the zero hurdle is crossed and are modeled
through a truncated (from the left) negative binomial model, whereas the probability
to cross the hurdle is modeled via a censored negative binomial model (see, e.g.,
Cameron and Trivedi 1998). As we use a negative binomial model for the count as
well as for the binary part of the hurdle model, we restrict both dispersion parameters
to the same value (as recommended by Winkelmann 2010, p. 183).
Table 2 shows the same models as Table 1, but using negative binomial hurdle
models instead of the (single-equation) Poisson models. As in the original analysis,
standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
3 Strictly speaking, firms first decide whether or not to patent. However, we use citation-weighted patents
per year as the dependent variable in both parts of the hurdle model, as the differences in the results for
citations versus patents per year are small. Also, one could consider a different aggregation period for the
patents/citations but certainly the technological challenges for new first innovations have been changing
over the course of the decade.
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Furthermore, a test for the presence of a zero hurdle is conducted. It is aWald test to
check for pairwise equality between all reported coefficients from the two parts of the
hurdle model, where the null hypothesis claims that no hurdle is needed (Zeileis et al.
2008). In the event of two identical processes, the estimated parameters in both model
parts should be similar as well. On the contrary, we find evidence that our estimated
parameters differ in both model parts, which allows us to draw the conclusion that a
single equation is not enough.4
The results indicate that the coefficient of institutional ownership is for most of the
estimated hurdle models positive and significant. The only exception is the count part
of the Hurdle NegBin (3) model, where the coefficient of institutional ownership is
no longer significant. Quantitatively, a dampening of the coefficient of institutional
ownership in the count part of the model can be observed, and the more variables are
included into the model. In the binary part of the model, the coefficient of institutional
ownership is quite stable. For most of the other explanatory variables, a dampening
of the coefficients in both parts of the model can be observed and the more variables
are included into the model.
3 Competition models: career concerns versus lazy manager
Two hypotheses are considered by Aghion et al. (2013), the lazy manager hypothesis
and the career concerns hypothesis. Both hypotheses predict a positive relationship
between institutional ownership and innovation, but they differ with regard to product
market competition.
The lazy manager approach is based on ‘quiet life’ models developed by Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2003). It is assumed that managers prefer a quiet life, and want
to keep the status quo, as ‘…he [the average manager] seems to avoid creating new
plants as much as he avoids destroying old ones’ (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003,
p. 1072). If competition is high, there is no need for intensified monitoring, because
‘competiton is a source of discipline.’ (Hart 1983, p. 366). Hence, the lazy manager
approach implies that institutions and competition are substitutes (Aghion et al. 2013,
p. 292).
The career concerns hypothesis pays closer attention to the managerial labor mar-
ket. In a seminal paper, Fama (1980) investigates how pressure imposed bymanagerial
labor markets can discipline managers. As a manager’s talent is at least partially
unknown to other market participants ‘…investment decisions become tests that
provide information about talent. Perceptions about talent, in turn, determine the
manager’s future opportunity wage, and this is what makes investments risky from
the manager’s perspective even if income is not explicitly tied to profits’ (Holmstrom
1999, p. 178). Institutional investors insure the manager against career risks, as they
collect independent information (the crucial point here is the assumption of bettermon-
itoring abilities by institutional investors) and assess the ability of a manager based
on that information, and not solely based on revenue realization (Aghion et al. 2013).
4 If we not only take into account the reported coefficients, but also include time dummies for each year as
well as four-digit industry dummies, the obtained p values are even lower.
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Table 3 Competition Poisson models—replication
Model Poisson Poisson Poisson
Competition over time Varies Constant Constant
Sample Pooled High comp. Low comp.
Dependent variable Cites Cites Cites
(1) (2) (3)
Institutional owners −0.064* 0.009*** 0.000
(0.030) (0.001) (0.003)
ln(capital/labor) 0.452*** 0.564*** 0.206*
(0.141) (0.115) (0.081)
ln(sales) 0.189* 0.267*** 0.086
(0.075) (0.070) (0.063)






Fixed effects controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6208 3125 3083
AIC 444,893.694 298,559.057 131,075.768
BIC 445,923.934 299,000.502 131,636.898
This table shows the replication of a number of models from Table 2 in Aghion et al. (2013). All models
are Poisson regression models. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at three-digit industry level.
There are 803 different firms. Additionally, all regressions include time dummies for each year (with
reference category 1991) as well as four-digit industry dummies. Fixed effects controls are included using
the presample mean-scaling estimator developed by Blundell and Powell (2004). An industry is classified
as one with high competition if it is above the median of the 1−Lerner index. Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001
‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Thus, if competition is high, the positive effect of institutional investors on innova-
tion should be stronger. According to the career concerns hypothesis, institutions and
competition are complements (Aghion et al. 2013, p. 292).
Table 3 contains the replication of a selection of Poisson models conducted by
Aghion et al. (2013, p. 293), with product market competition included as a further
explanatory variable. The replication of all models from Table 2 in Aghion et al.
(2013, p. 293) was successful. For the sake of brevity, only a selection of these models
is presented here.
Column 1 displays a Poisson model with an interaction between product market
competiton and institutional ownership. As the coefficient has a positive sign and is
significant, this is indicative for the career concerns hypothesis and against the lazy
manager hypothesis.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 show two Poisson models based on a high- and low-
competition sample, respectively. The coefficient of institutional ownership is positive
and significant for the model based on the high-competition sample, whereas it is zero
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and insignificant for the low-competition model. Again, this result delivers evidence
for the career concerns hypothesis.
To show that the Poissonmodel with interaction term provides quantitatively nearly
the same conclusions as the two Poissonmodels with the data split into high versus low
product market competition, we use the following illustration. As a rough guideline,
assume a value of 0.9 for high competition, and a value of 0.8 for low competition.5
For high competition, the coefficient of institutional ownership (Table 3, column 1)
is −0.064 + 0.9 · 0.082 = 0.0098, whereas the coefficient has a value of −0.064 +
0.8 · 0.082 = 0.0016 for low competition. These coefficients are very close to those
in the models based on the high- and low-competition sample in Table 3, columns 2
and 3, with values of 0.009 and 0.000. Thus, with regard to the interpretation of the
institutional ownership coefficient, there is hardly any difference between a modeling
strategy based on an ‘interaction view’ and a ‘sub-sample view.’
Table 4 contains the samemodels as Table 3, but again hurdle models are employed,
instead of Poisson models. If both zero and nonzero citations were driven by the same
determinants, then both parts of the hurdle model should deliver similar results as the
Poisson model. Again, all hurdle tests accomplished indicate that a single equation
is not enough (see Table 4). However, it is observed that the clear preference for the
career concerns hypothesis and against the lazy manager hypothesis heavily depends
on the model framework. When hurdle models are used, the empirical results do not
show such a clear picture. Even more, there is some evidence that neither the lazy
manager hypothesis nor the career concerns hypothesis can satisfactorily explain the
mechanisms at work.
The coefficient of the interaction term of competition times the share of institutional
owners [Hurdle NegBin (1)] is negative and significant (at the 5 % significance level)
in the zero part of the model, whereas it is positive but not significant in the count
part of the model. The fact that the interaction term in the zero part of the model has
a negative sign cannot be explained by either the career concerns hypothesis or the
lazy manager hypothesis because only the former leads to a significant interaction
but requires that the coefficient of the interaction term is positive. However, here the
influence of institutional ownership is different in the two parts of the model, which
can also be observed in themodels with the sample split into high and low competition.
In the high-competition sample, the coefficient of institutional ownership is positive
in both parts of the model, but only in the count part significant [Hurdle NegBin (2)],
whereas the coefficient is positive in both parts of the model for the low-competition
sample, too, but only significant in the zero part of the model [Hurdle NegBin (3)].
Furthermore, a similar numerical illustration as shown above also applies to hurdle
models.6
5 The first and third quartile of product market competition constant over time are 0.83 and 0.89, respec-
tively. For the sake of simplicity, 0.8 and 0.9 are used in the illustration leading to qualitatively the same
interpretation.
6 Using the same numbers as before, the coefficient of institutional ownership [Table 4, count part of Hurdle
NegBin (1)] is−0.014+0.9 ·0.019 = 0.0031 for the high-competition sample and−0.014+0.8 ·0.019 =
0.0012 for the low-competition sample, which is again approximately equal to the coefficients of the count
parts in Table 4, Hurdle NegBin (2) and Hurdle NegBin (3), with values of 0.003 and 0.002. For the binary
part of the models, the coefficient is 0.083 − 0.9 · 0.086 = 0.0056 and 0.083 − 0.8 · 0.086 = 0.0142
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A possible explanation might be the risk behavior of institutional investors. Xu
et al. (2015) find that institutional owners are risk averse preferring loss aversion
over superior performance (see also Bodnaruk and Simonov 2016; Porter and Trifts
2014), and do not encourage (or even impede) innovation activities which carry greater
risk. Our results indicate that this might be the case in highly competitive and thus
potentially riskier markets. Summing up, the influence of institutional ownership on
innovation is in both parts of the models positive, but not in every part significant. This
result can be seen as an image with a higher resolution than is possible to generate
within the Poisson approach.
In a nutshell, the discrimination between the career concerns hypothesis on the one
hand and the lazy manager hypothesis on the other hand based on Poisson models
does not produce the same results as a modeling strategy based on a hurdle (or even a
negative binomial) model.
As a consequence, this raises the issuewhether the conclusions drawn in theAghion
et al. (2013) paper are robust. Of course, we most certainly cannot stand here and say
that the use of hurdle models is the most suitable solution. In the alternative, should
it be held that the Poisson model would be the most appropriate model, the hurdle
model should deliver similar results. The results we have achieved do not point in that
direction, though. Instead,wefind that innovation is differently affected by institutional
owners in the two parts of a hurdle model. Any conclusion that shows preference for
the career concerns hypothesis and against the lazy manager hypothesis cannot be
drawn in such a setting.
4 Conclusion
Based on a successful replication in a narrow sense of (parts of) theAghion et al. (2013)
paper, a refinement of the modeling strategy reveals differences with regard to the sign
and significance of the coefficients of interest, and hence also to the interpretation. The
results obtained from an extended analysis with negative binomial hurdlemodels differ
materially from the outcomes of the single-equation Poisson approach carried out by
Aghion et al. (2013).While the Poisson-based model delivers a clear indication for the
career concerns hypothesis and against the lazy manager hypothesis, there is evidence
for a deviation from the Poisson model. Both economic and statistical considerations
suggest that different determinants may drive zero and nonzero patent citations. If
a single set of determinants is sufficient for describing the underlying innovation
processes, then both parts of the hurdle model should lead to estimates that are similar
to the coefficients from the Poisson equation. However, both sign and significance
of the coefficients of interest change when employing the hurdle model (using the
same type of clustered standard errors as in the Poisson case), providing evidence
for differing determinants. In the event that the innovation process can accurately be
Footnote6 continued
for the high- and low-competition sample, respectively. The coefficients of institutional ownership in the
binary part in Table 4, Hurdle NegBin (2) and Hurdle NegBin (3) are 0.005 and 0.012. Equivalent to the
illustration based on Poisson models, hardly any differences should be found between an ‘interaction view’
and a ‘sub-sample view.’
123
Innovation and institutional ownership revisited
described as one equation, both parts of the hurdle model should deliver similar results
as the Poisson model. All the hurdle tests performed indicate that a single equation is
not enough.
From an economic perspective, this is a difference in determinants of ‘first innova-
tion’ and ‘continuing innovation,’ respectively. If it is the case that the first innovation
(the first citation-weighted patent count) is especially hard to obtain in comparison
with succeeding innovations, hurdlemodels offer a useful way that allows for a distinc-
tion to be made between these two processes. The rationale behind this is the notion of
nonlinearities in the innovation process (König and Licht 1995; Licht and Zoz 1996;
Crepon and Duguet 1997; Brouwer and Kleinknecht 1999; Mohnen and Röller 2005;
Mäkinen 2007). Then, the processes that drive innovative outcome might themselves
be affected by a number of different driving factors.
The empirical findings resulting from the extended analysis concerning the dis-
crimination between the lazy manager hypothesis and the career concerns hypothesis
indicate that neither hypothesis is completely satisfactory. The unambiguous, inter-
pretable picture arising out of the analysis of Aghion et al. (2013) cannot be fully
confirmed when hurdle models are used. A possible explanation for our results is
the risk behavior of institutional investors, who do not encourage more hazardous
innovation activities (as also found by Xu et al. 2015). Nevertheless, there is some
evidence for a remarkably stable positive correlation of citation-weighted patents and
institutional ownership across specifications.
5 Computational details
The results of the empirical analysis are obtained using R 3.1.0 (R Core Team 2013)
with the packages AER 1.2-1, foreign 0.8-61, MASS 7.3-33 (Venables and Ripley
2002), countreg 0.1-3 (Zeileis et al. 2008) especially for the function hurdle(), and
sandwich 2.3-0 (Zeileis 2006).
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